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EXPANDING THE SCARCITY 
RATIONALE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC 
ACCESS REQUIREMENTS IN 
CABLE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy 
Act (the Cable Act),1 which authorizes local governments to im-
pose public access requirements in their cable franchise agree-
ments.2 Despite Congress' explicit approval of public access re-
quirements in the Cable Act, considerable debate exists over the 
constitutionality of such requirements. Cable operators contend 
that the imposition of access requirements unconstitutionally re-
stricts their editorial discretion, while access proponents insist 
that public access to the cable medium advances the goals of the 
first amendment. 3 
This Note argues that public access requirements should be 
upheld because they are constitutional and because they further 
the goals of the first amendment. As background for the debate 
over public access, Part I provides a brief description of cable 
television's history and regulation and discusses the case law 
concerning public access requirements. Part II examines the na-
ture of the first amendment interests at stake in public access 
requirements. Before resolving the question of which interests 
should be protected, Part III argues that an expanded scarcity 
rationale should be used to justify cable regulation under the 
first amendment. Part IV asserts that public access require-
1. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III 
1985)). The Cable Act amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), by providing for a new Title V-A entitled "Cable Communica-
tions," id. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III 1985). 
2. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985). The term "public access" generally describes a 
cable operator's setting aside of a channel, several channels, or some portion of a channel 
for free use on a "first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis." Meyerson, The Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. 
REV. 543, 585 (1985). For a similar definition of public access, see CREATING ORIGINAL 
PROGRAMMING FoR CABLE TV 156 (1983). This Note will use "public access" to indicate 
public, educational, and governmental (PEG) access. 
3. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. 
. . " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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ments are constitutional under the expanded scarcity rationale 
and that they further the goals of the rationale. Finally, this 
Part emphasizes the effectiveness of public access channels in 
promoting the goals of the first amendment and the limited na-
ture of the intrusion on editorial discretion posed by public ac-
cess requirements. This Note concludes that public access re-
quirements are not only constitutional, but that they off er a 
sensible compromise of the first amendment interests of both 
cable operators and the public. 
I. OVERVIEW OF CABLE REGULATION AND PUBLIC ACCESS 
REQUIREMENTS 
In Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke;' the Rhode Island district 
court upheld the constitutionality of public access requirements 
in state regulations. A year later, Congress established similar 
public access requirements in the 1984 Cable Act.11 Before as-
sessing the constitutionality of these requirements, it is neces-
sary to review the history of cable television, the regulation of 
cable television under the Cable Act, and the case law concern-
ing the constitutionality of public access requirements. 
A. A Brief Description of Cable Television 
In contrast to older communications technologies, such as 
print, radio, and broadcast television, cable television first ap-
peared in the United States in the 1940's.6 In those early days, 
the purpose of cable television was to provide residents of rural 
areas with better reception than they were receiving from over-
the-air broadcast signals.7 Today, the nature of cable television 
has changed dramatically.8 Viewed as the "medium of abun-
4. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). 
5. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 611, 98 Stat. 2779, 2782 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. 
III 1985)). 
6. See generally Bollinger, On the Legal Relationship Between Old and New Tech-
nologies of Communication, 26 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 269 (1983) (discussing the impor-
tance of cable television as a new communications technology). 
7. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CoNG. 
& Ao. NEws 4655, 4657. 
8. "Nearly half of all U.S. homes with televisions are wired for cable television, and 
the proportion is expected to increase." Cable TV Operators May Be Required to Carry 
Local Broadcast Stations, Wall St. J., July 23, 1986, at 50, col. 1. 
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dance,"9 cable television now offers more channels than conven-
tional television broadcasting is capable of providing. Io Unlike 
broadcast television, cable does not rely upon the limited space 
of the electromagnetic spectrum. Rather, a cable operator re-
ceives signals from such sources as local and national broadcast-
ers and converts them into an electronic impulse that is deliv-
ered to cable subscribers over a coaxial cable. 11 Finally, a cable 
operator creates the cable service offered to the public by select-
ing from various programming services, producing local pro-
gramming, and, usually, providing space for access channels. I2 
B. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
The 1984 Cable Act established the first national policy for 
cable television in the United States. I3 Congress passed the leg-
islation to remedy the existing "patchwork" of state, municipal, 
and federal cable regulations. I" Legislators viewed cable televi-
sion as a medium that was trapped by a haphazard, illogical reg-
ulatory schemeI6 and that possessed vast, untapped potential for 
9. See, e.g., SLOAN CoMM'N ON CABLE CoMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVI-
SION OF ABUNDANCE (1971). 
10. While some estimates set current cable capacity at 100 to 200 channels, a more 
typical figure ranges from 12 to 36 channels. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 
1439 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); see also K. BECK, CULTI-
VATING THE WASTELAND 8-9 (1983). 
The abundant quality of cable television is also evident in cable's capacity to provide a 
diversity of services in addition to entertainment, including: "fire, medical, alarm, and 
alert services; data transmission; text services, home shopping and banking services; traf-
fic signalization; meter reading; and highly specialized programming." Buske, Status Re-
port on Community Access Programming on Cable, in 3 THE CABLE/BROADBAND COMMU-
NICATIONS BooK 102, 102-03 (M. Hollowell ed. 1983). 
11. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1438-39; see also Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 
700-01 (1984). 
12. Cable operators generally rely upon three basic operating structures for the ad-
ministration of access: (1) the cable company itself may provide facilities and support 
mechanisms for access; (2) an institution, such as a local library, school, or college, may 
serve as the facility for access programming; or (3) a nonprofit corporation may manage 
the access facilities. Buske, supra note 10, at 106-07. 
13. The Cable Act explicitly lists the establishment of "a national policy concerning 
cable communications" as one of its central purposes. 47 U.S.C. § 521(1) (Supp. III 
1985); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CONG. 
& An. NEws at 4656. 
Congress first considered cable legislation over 25 years ago. See, e.g., H.R. 6840, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); see also Meyerson, supra 
note 2, at 544 n.4. 
14. 130 CONG. REC. HI0,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth); 129 
CONG. REC. S8252-53 (daily ed. June 13, 1983) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
15. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983). 
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revolutionizing the communications world.16 Senator Goldwater, 
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, ar-
gued that Congress needed to establish a national policy for 
cable "if the cable industry, the cities, and most of all, the con-
sumers, are to ever reap the benefits of cable's potential."17 
The Cable Act delegates most of the authority for regulating 
cable to local governments. 18 A cable operator must obtain a 
franchise from the franchising authority, usually a state or mu-
nicipality, in order to provide cable services.19 The franchising 
authority lists the conditions for receiving a franchise in a "Re-
quest for Proposals. "20 After the submission of applications, an 
auction or similar process generally follows; the local govern-
ment then awards the cable franchise to the winning applicant. 21 
Once awarded a franchise, the cable operator may begin to pro-
vide cable services for the community.22 The Cable Act's access 
provisions-both public and commercial-mark the first explicit 
congressional approval of third-party access to cable television.23 
16. 130 CONG. REC. Hl0,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) ("Cable television, perhaps more 
than any other medium, has the potential to deliver the benefits of the information age 
into the homes of our citizens.") (statement of Rep. Wirth); see id. at Hl0,444 (state-
ment of Rep. Markey); see also CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE: RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT 9 (1974). 
17. 129 CONG. REC. S8252-53 (daily ed. June 13, 1983). The Senator feared that if a 
cable bill was not passed, the current system of federal, state, and local regulation would 
be "too firmly entrenched to undo." Id. at S8253; see also 130 CONG. REC. S14,283 (daily 
ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood). 
18. The Cable Act allows local governments to grant franchises. 47 U.S.C. § 541 
(Supp. III 1985). This transfer of authority from the FCC to local governments accorded 
with Congress' belief that local communities would know their own needs for cable ser-
vices better than the federal government. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 24, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 4661. 
19. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act defines "franchising author-
ity" as "any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local law to grant a 
franchise." Id. § 522(9). 
20. J. ROMAN, CABLEMANIA: THE CABLE TELEVISION SouRCEBOOK 136 (1983). 
21. For a description of an auction, see Preferred Communications v. City of Los 
Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 
(1986). 
22. The cable system operator may be a lone operator or may be part of a larger 
company, such as a multiple systems operator (MSO), which owns several cable opera-
tions. K. BECK, supra note 10, at 10-11. 
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-532 (Supp. III 1985). In addition to the public access provision, 
the Cable Act has a commercial access provision, which states that a cable operator 
"shall designate channel capacity for commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the 
operator." Id. § 532. 
S. 2172 contained the first public access provision for cable television to be introduced 
into Congress. The Senate bill would have imposed a strict requirement that certain 
cable operators set aside 20~;, of their available channels: 10~;, for PEG channel pro-
grammers and 10\';, for other channel programmers. S. 2172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 606(a) (1982). The Senate report accompanying the bill indicated that the provision 
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Section 611 allows franchising authorities to include public ac-
cess requirements in their franchise agreements.24 Cable opera-
tors may be required to set aside entire channels or channel ca-
pacity (only a portion of a particular channel).211 The Cable Act 
delegates responsibility for enforcing any requirement regarding 
the use of public, educational, and government (PEG) channel 
capacity to the local franchising authority.26 
would establish "a Federal and uniform standard for access." S. REP. No. 518, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982). 
24. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act authorizes franchising authorities 
to require, as part of a franchise or renewal proposal, "that channel capacity be desig-
nated for public, educational, or governmental [PEG] use." Id. § 531(b). Although the 
Cable Act uses the language of "public use" rather than "public access," Congress appar-
ently intended the terms to be interpreted synonymously. Meyerson, supra note 2, at 
585-86. 
A franchising authority may also require that channel capacity on an institutional net-
work be designated for educational and governmental use. 47 U.S.C. § 531(b) (Supp. III 
1985). The Cable Act defines an "institutional network" as a communications network 
that is generally available to nonresidential subscribers. Id. § 531(0. 
25. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 46, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS at 4683. A specifically-designated channel may be a crucial factor in the success of 
public access programming. When access programming appears only on a portion of a 
particular channel or fills space on several channels, "[i]t is very difficult to establish an 
identity and a viewership." Buske, supra note 10, at 107 (emphasis omitted). 
26. 47 U.S.C. § 531(c) (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act contains several provisions, 
aside from § 611, that discuss public access channels. First, § 622 allows a franchising 
authority to require a cable operator to pay a franchise fee. The fee may not exceed five 
percent of the operator's gross revenues derived from the cable operation. Id. § 542. 
Some payments, however, are excluded from the definition of a franchise fee and, thus, 
from the five percent ceiling. For example, for franchises in existence on the effective 
date of the law, payments made "for, or in support of the use of' PEG access "facilities" 
are exempted. Id. § 542(g)(2)(B). For franchises granted after that date, the Cable Act 
excludes capital costs associated with PEG facilities from the definition of franchise fee. 
Id. § 542(g)(2)(C). See generally Meyerson, supra note 2, at 555-59; Ciamporcero, Is 
There Any Hope for Cities? Recent Developments in Cable Television Law, 18 URB. 
LAW. 369, 375 (1986). Furthermore, the House Report explicitly states that the franchise 
fee includes "only monetary payments made by the cable operator, and does not include 
as a 'fee' any franchise requirements for the provision of services, facilities or equip-
ment." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 65, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEws at 4702. The language of the House Report leaves unclear whether expenses asso-
ciated with new equipment would be excluded from the franchise fee and the five per-
cent ceiling. See Meyerson, supra note 2, at 558 (arguing that only specific requirements 
for cash payments are subject to the ceiling). But see Ciamporcero, supra, at 375 (sug-
gesting that creative municipal officers could characterize certain expenses as a facilities 
grant and thus count these expenses within the franchise fee). 
Second, § 624 allows the franchising authority to establish requirements for facilities 
and equipment in its requests for franchise proposals-for both new franchises and re-
newals-and to enforce these requirements. 47 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. III 1985). 
Third, the Cable Act contains a grandfather provision, § 637, which retroactively vali-
dates any PEG requirements set forth in a franchise in existence on the effective date of 
the Act, or in any state law or regulation in effect on the date of enactment, even if the 
franchise has not expressly adopted that law or regulation. Id. § 557(a)(l)-(2); see also 
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C. Challenges to Public Access Requirements 
Case law addressing the constitutionality of public access re-
quirements for cable television remains scarce.27 The Supreme 
Court's only review of public access regulations came in FCC v. 
Midwest Video Corp., 28 in which the Court found that the FCC 
had exceeded its jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 
1934. 29 The Court declined to address the first amendment is-
sues involved in mandatory access requirements, noting only 
that the question of whether the rules might be unconstitutional 
was "not frivolous. "30 
H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 94, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 
4731. 
Finally, the Cable Act sets forth procedures for modification of public access obliga-
tions under§ 625. 47 U.S.C. § 545 (Supp. III 1985). The statute prohibits franchise mod-
ification for "services" relating to PEG access, but allows modification under certain cir-
cumstances for PEG "facilities or equipment." Id. § 545(a)(l)(A). To qualify, a cable 
operator must demonstrate that it is commercially impracticable to comply with such 
requirements, and must demonstrate the appropriateness of the proposed modification. 
Id. 
27. Challenges to the franchising process itself currently make up a large portion of 
the first amendment attacks on cable regulation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Pre-
ferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). The franchise selection process raises 
several first amendment issues because of the restrictions it imposes upon cable opera-
tors, including: (1) the award of a single franchise in a particular area and prevention of 
access by other cable services; (2) the evaluation of the content of cable programming; 
and (3) the imposition of certain programming requirements, such as public and com-
mercial access. Note, Cable Television: The Constitutional Limitations of Local Govern-
ment Control, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 181, 186-87 (1984). 
28. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
29. Id.; see also Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2036 n.2 (declining to ad-
dress other conditions, including public access requirements, imposed upon a successful 
franchise applicant). At the appellate court level, however, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
the mandatory and leased access requirements contained in § 611 and § 612 of the Cable 
Act "pose[d] particularly troubling constitutional questions" because "[i]mposing access 
requirements on the press would no doubt be invalid." Preferred Communications v. 
City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1401 n.4, alf'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). 
30. 440 U.S. at 709 n.19. At the appellate level, the Eighth Circuit held that the FCC 
had exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing public access requirements on certain cable 
operators. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), alf'd on other 
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Although finding it unnecessary to decide the issue, the 
court also engaged in an extended first amendment analysis of public access require-
ments. The court found nothing to distinguish cable systems from newspapers and deter-
mined that the same first amendment protection should apply to both media. Id. at 
1055-56. The court concluded that if it had to decide the issue, it would find the require-
ments unconstitutional. Id. at 1056. The Supreme Court's subsequent and rather abrupt 
consideration of the first amendment issue thus left the appropriateness of the Eighth 
Circuit's analysis as an open question. For the argument that cable systems should not 
be equated with newspapers, see infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text. 
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More recently, in Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 31 a cable 
television company presented a direct first amendment challenge 
to public access requirements. Berkshire Cablevision challenged 
state regulations, promulgated by the Rhode Island Division of 
Public Utilities and Carriers (DPUC), that required cable opera-
tors to provide public access channels as a condition for receiv-
ing a franchise. 32 The district court upheld the regulations as 
constitutional.33 On appeal, however, the First Circuit vacated 
the lower court's decision because the DPUC had awarded the 
cable franchise to an applicant who, unlike Berkshire Cablevi-
sion, did not object to the public access requirements.3 ' 
The district court's opinion in Berkshire remains the most re-
cent interpretation of the constitutionality of public access regu-
lations and retains an important vitality because of its first 
amendment analysis. 36 The court equated the first amendment 
rights of cable operators with those of broadcasters, arguing that 
Rhode Island's "[m]andatory access requirements are even less 
intrusive on First Amendment freedoms than the fairness doc-
trine [imposed on broadcasters and] upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Red Lion. "86 Under this analogy to broadcasters, the 
court upheld the public access regulations and concluded that 
the requirements represented "a sensible accommodation of the 
rights of individuals to express themselves, the editorial freedom 
31. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). For 
discussions of the Berkshire case, see Comment, Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke: Toward 
a Functional First Amendment Classification of Cable Operators, 70 lowA L. REV. 525 
(1985) [hereinafter Comment, Functional Classification]; Comment, Public Access 
Channels in Cable Television: The Economic Scarcity Rationale of Berkshire v. Burke, 
74 Kv. L.J. 249 (1985-1986) [hereinafter Comment, Economic Scarcity]; Comment, Pub-
lic Access to Cable Television and the First Amendment, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 96, 
110-16 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Public Access]. 
32. The DPUC regulations required that cable operators provide at least one PEG 
channel and construct an institutional network for use, at a fee, by community organiza-
tions such as schools and religious groups. 571 F. Supp. at 978. 
33. Id. at 988. 
34. The First Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint as 
moot. 773 F.2d at 386. 
35. The vitality of Berkshire can be seen in the FCC's reliance on the case to avoid 
extensive comment on the Cable Act's public access provision. In its 1985 Report and 
Order, the FCC set forth regulations for certain portions of the Cable Act including those 
relating to access. The FCC's Report, however, gives only cursory attention to § 611, 
stating that questions as to the section's constitutionality had been resolved in Berk-
shire. 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,642 (1985). 
36. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 988 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367 (1969)). For a comparison of the fairness doctrine and public access channels, 
see infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
312 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:1 
of cable television operators and the rights of viewers to receive 
information. "37 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS AT STAKE IN THE PROVISION 
OF PUBLIC ACCESS CHANNELS 
In the debates over the 1984 Cable Act, Congress character-
ized public access channels as "the video equivalent of the 
speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaf-
let."38 Although Congress viewed public access as an important 
means for furthering first amendment "speech," cable operators 
contend that the first amendment should protect their interests 
in a regulation-free cable medium. It is thus important to ex-
amine the first amendment interests of both the public and 
cable operators in the provision of public access channels. 
A. First Amendment Interests of the Public 
Public access channels further many of the goals of the first 
amendment. 39 First, public access channels provide the public 
with an opportunity to use the cable medium to express their 
views and ideas and to convey information. Public access thus 
contributes to the first amendment goal of enhancing the mar-
ketplace of ideas.''0 The influx of additional viewpoints also in-
37. Id. 
38. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS at 4667. 
39. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce explicitly noted in its report on 
H.R. 4103 that although it was "aware that access provisions ha[d] been challenged in 
the court[s) as inconsistent with the First Amendment rights of cable operators," the 
Committee felt that these provisions were "consistent with and further[ed] the goals of 
the First Amendment." Id. at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
4668. 
40. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
("[T)he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market .... "); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390. The House 
Report stated that the purpose of the cable legislation was to promote the "First Amend-
ment's goal of a robust marketplace of ideas-an environment of 'many tongues speaking 
many voices.'" H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS at 4656. The Report also stated that public access channels "provide groups 
and individuals who generally have not had access to the electronic media with the op-
portunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas." Id. at 
30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 4667; see also 130 CONG. REc. 
Hl0,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 
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creases the diversity of expression within society•1 and thus ful-
fills the democracy rationale, which asserts that freedom of 
speech must be protected in a self-governing society so that the 
people can make enlightened political decisions. •2 The charac-
terization by Congress of public access channels as "the video 
equivalent of the speaker's soap box" clearly exemplifies this be-
lief that public access channels help to foster a robust public 
debate.43 
Public access channels aid the first amendment goal of self-
expression by providing members of the public with an opportu-
nity to "speak" through the cable medium. 44 By making free ac-
41. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
42. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2934, 2945-46 (1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); see also A. MEIKLE.JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND !Ts RELATION TO SELF-
GovERNMENT 24-27 (1948); A. MEIKLE.JOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26, 35-36 (1960); Bollin-
ger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438 (1983); Kalven, The New 
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 
SUP. CT. REV. 191. 
43. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. 
NEws at 4667. The legislative history of the Cable Act is replete with additional refer-
ences to Congress' intent to use cable legislation and, specifically, the public access pro-
vision to further the first amendment goals of fostering diversity of expression and fulfil-
ling the democracy rationale. For example, the Cable Act lists as one of its central 
purposes assuring "that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide 
the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public." 47 U.S.C. 
§ 521(4) (Supp. III 1985). An earlier cable bill, H.R. 4103, included a statement of pur-
pose for its "diversity of information sources" section that stated: "It is the purpose of 
this [section] to assure the widest possible diversity of information sources for the public 
through cable telecommunications .... " H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, § 611 
(1983). 
Throughout the debates and in the reports on the cable bills, members of Congress 
repeatedly emphasized their belief that the Cable Act would further the goals of the first 
amendment. Options for Cable Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 4103, H.R. 4229, and H.R. 
4299 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Options for Cable Regulation Hearings) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("Cable of-
fers the capacity to increase the variety of information and viewpoints available to the 
public."); id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Matsui) ("Diversity of ideas is essential to the fos-
tering of our democracy .... "); H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in 1984 
U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws at 4667 (stating that public access will make available a 
wide diversity of information sources to the public, which is a fundamental goal of the 
first amendment); 130 CONG. REC. Hl0,440 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Rinaldo) (Public access progamming "is extraordinarily important to the citizens in the 
community that are served by cable, and it promises to bring with it a more enlightened 
citizenry."); 129 CONG. REC. S8257 (daily ed. June 13, 1983) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg) ("Educational, community, and governmental groups should have access to 
increase the diversity of views available."). 
44. See T. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); see also CABI-
NET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 16, at 15-16 (noting that cable has 
much to offer in the marketplace of goods and ideas because it combines television and 
active participation); SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 9, at 123-24. 
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cess available to all on a nondiscriminatory basis, public access 
provisions also provide an opportunity for the expression of mi-
nority views within society. Access offers a "television voice to 
the dissenter, the unpopular, and the minority as well as to 
[public interest] organizations."411 Finally, by providing an addi-
tional outlet for public expression, public access may fulfill the 
first amendment goal of allowing the expression of speech to act 
as a safety valve for discontent within society.46 
B. First Amendment Interests of Cable Operators 
Cable operators, in contrast to access proponents, argue that 
public access requirements violate their first amendment 
rights.47 By requiring cable operators to offer access to the pub-
lic, public access provisions limit the operators' control over the 
composition of their cable services, and deprive the operator of a 
channel that, otherwise, could be used for different purposes.48 
45. K. BECK, supra note 10, at 113. Financial concerns, however, may limit the use of 
public access channels by unorganized groups. "Ambitious and imaginative access pro-
gramming probably will become the preserve of organized interest groups that can use 
access to further their general aims. Unaffiliated persons and groups without cohesion or 
resources may not be able to produce imaginative programming." B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS VERSUS PUBLIC ACCESS 210 (1976); see also infra notes 63-64 and accompa-
nying text. 
46. See SLOAN CoMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 9, at 125; Barron, Ac-
cess to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1668-69 
(1967); Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Television Operator: An Unpro-
tective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM/ENT 1, 35 (1981); 
Minenberg, Circumstances Within Our Control: Promoting Freedom of Expression 
Through Cable Television, 11 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 551, 598 (1984). 
47. See, e.g., G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, CABLESPEECH 77-136 (1983) 
[hereinafter G. SHAPIRO]; Note, Cable Television: A New Challenge for the "Old" First 
Amendment, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 114 (1985). 
To date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the first amendment rights of 
cable operators. Recently, in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 
S. Ct. 2034 (1986), the Court declined to address the first amendment issues in a cable 
franchise scheme without a more fully developed factual record. Id. at 2038. 
48. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 82; see also Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 
1434, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The more certain injury stems from the substantial limita-
tions the [must-carry] rules work on the operator's otherwise broad discretion to select 
the programming it offers its subscribers."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Midwest 
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating that access require-
ments "strip" cable operators of "all rights of material selection, editorial judgment, and 
discretion"), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Note, supra note 27, at 211-12; 
infr<,1 note 58 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Access to Cable Televi-
sion: A Critique of the Affirmative Duty Theory of the First Amendment, 70 CAL. L. 
REV. 1393 (1982). 
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To this extent, public access requirements obviously intrude 
upon a cable operator's editorial discretion. 
At least one commentator, however, has questioned the sincer-
ity of the cable operators' reliance on the first amendment for 
protection of editorial discretion. ' 9 Although cable operators 
may produce some original programming, they fill most of their 
channels by selecting between various programming services, in-
cluding whole networks such as Cable News Network (CNN) 
and full-time programs like Music Television (MTV). As a re-
sult, cable operators often appear less like traditional first 
amendment "speakers" than they do businessmen,6° and, ac-
cordingly, some argue that they should not receive complete first 
amendment protection.111 
To date, however, courts have refused to view the cable opera-
tor's editorial discretion so narrowly.112 The United States Su-
preme Court recently reaffirmed that the activities of cable oper-
ators, including the production of original programming and 
exercise of editorial discretion over which stations or programs 
to use in a particular system, "plainly implicate" first amend-
ment interests.118 In addition, lower courts have repeatedly noted 
49. Barnett, Franchising of Cable TV Systems To Get Airing at Supreme Court, 
Nat'! L.J., Apr. 21, 1986, at 42, col. 3, 44 n.20, col. 3. 
Another commentator has questioned whether the mass media's first amendment ar-
gument against access is "pretense or reality." Barron, supra note 46, at 1663 (quoting 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966)). Alexander Meiklejohn similarly 
expressed disappointment with radio: "It is not engaged in the task of enlarging and 
enriching human communication. It is engaged in making money." A. MEIKLEJOHN. Po-
LITJCAL FREEDOM. supra note 42, at 87. 
50. See Bollinger, supra note 6, at 290-91 (noting that the new media, such as cable, 
are often part of large corporations and that, as a result, "in the freedom of press area, 
we may be losing the sense ... of a 'speaker'"). 
51. In light of the commercial nature of much of the speech of the mass media, one 
commentator argues, "When commercial considerations dominate, often leading the me-
dia to repress ideas, these media should not be allowed to resist controls designed to 
promote vigorous debate and expression by cynical reliance on the first amendment." 
Barron, supra note 46, at 1663. Another commentator argues that it is "perverse" to 
allow the cable operator, "in the name of the First Amendment, to stand astride the 
cable gateway and prevent those speakers from reaching the public except at his pleas-
ure." Barnett, supra note 49, at 44 n.20, col. 3. 
52. Recent cases have instead noted that the editorial discretion of cable operators 
has dramatically expanded since the cable industry's infancy. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV 
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Pre-
ferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1410 n.10 (9th Cir. 1985), 
aff'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); see also Comment, Economic Scarcity, 
supra note 31, at 260-62. 
53. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037 (noting that cable television "par-
takes of some of the aspects of speech and the communication of ideas as do the tradi-
tional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public speakers and 
pamphleteers"). 
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the first amendment interests of cable operators and have de-
clined to set limits on this editorial discretion.~• These courts 
have refused to accord less first amendment protection on the 
basis of a speaker's identity or purposes in speaking. H Instead, 
the courts have recognized the difficulty of drawing any line be-
tween the various possible purposes of a speaker's expression 
and have reaffirmed the importance of the first amendment 
rights at stake. GS Thus, although the commercial concerns of 
54. See, e.g., Pacific W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 798 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 
1986); Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1444; Tele-Communications of Key West v. United States, 
757 F.2d 1330, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapo-
lis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Midwest 
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052-57 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 
U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 43-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp. 
801, 809 (W.D. Mich. 1985); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 
1562 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 980 (D.R.I. 
1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985); Hopkinsville Cable TV v. Penny-
royal Cablevision, 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982). 
Certain activities of the cable operator fall outside the protection of the first amend-
ment, including: the construction of the system; the provision of noncommunicative ser-
vices, such as transactional services; and the transmission of signals. Recent Develop-
ments-Aid or Obstruction? Government Regulation of Cable Television Meets the 
First Amendment, 61 WASH. L. REV. 665, 688 (1986). 
55. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 907 (1986) ("The 
identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Cor-
porations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, 
and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to fos-
ter.") (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)); Preferred Commu-
nications, 754 F.2d at 1410 n.10 (denying that plaintiff could lose its first amendment 
rights "merely because its judgment is tempered by commercial considerations"); First 
Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 ("The inherent worth of the speech ... does not depend 
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."); 
id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting) ("There is now little doubt that corporate communica-
tions come within the scope of the First Amendment."); Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 
1053 ("Government control of business operations must be most closely scrutinized when 
it affects communication of information and ideas .... "). 
56. Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1053 (" 'The line between informing and entertaining 
is too elusive for the protection .. .' of First Amendment rights to turn on that distinc-
tion.") (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)); see Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973) (stating that even 
though newspaper and broadcast editors can and do abuse their editorial discretion, 
there is no reason to deny first amendment protection because "(c]alculated risks of 
abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values"); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973): 
If [a] newspaper's profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its opera-
tions-from the selection of news stories to the choice of editorial posi-
tion-would be subject to regulation if it could be established that they were 
conducted with a view toward increased sales. Such a basis for regulation clearly 
would be incompatible with the First Amendment. 
See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[I)t is largely because governmen-
tal officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves 
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cable operators may taint the sincerity of their reliance on the 
first amendment, courts properly have not weakened first 
amendment protection because of this factor. 
By intruding upon the editorial discretion of cable operators, 
public access regulations necessarily increase the risk of creating 
dangers that the first amendment was intended to prevent. Most 
importantly, public access requirements intrude upon a cable 
operator's free expression-the right to create a cable service 
without government restrictions117-and, therefore, essentially 
deprive cable operators of control over their own channels.118 
Government regulation also increases the risk of discrimination 
against a franchise applicant on the basis of the views or content 
of proposed programs.119 
Finally, public access requirements threaten operators with di-
rect government censorship of the programming on their chan-
nels. 8° For instance, the Cable Act itself explicitly prohibits 
cable operators from exercising any editorial control over public 
access channels. 81 Yet the statute does not address whether 
matters of taste and style so largely to the individual."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public 
opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to 
inform."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (concluding 
that moving pictures are protected by the first amendment). 
57. See Dworkin, ls the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Dec. 
4, 1980, at 49, 50 ("[T]he historically central function of the First Amendment ... is 
simply to ensure that those who wish to speak ... are free to do so."). 
58. See K. BECK, supra note 10, at 115; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 
908 ("Compelled access ... forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an 
agenda they do not set."). The House Report expressly states that there is no limitation 
on the government's control over the channels set aside for governmental purposes. H.R. 
REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
4684. Governmental channels are "to be programmed as the government sees fit" so long 
as the uses relate to governmental access. Meyerson, supra note 2, at 587; see also H.R. 
REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
4684. Both the cable operators and the franchising authority may, however, prohibit 
cable services that are "obscene or are otherwise unprotected by the Constitution." 47 
U.S.C. § 544(d)(l) (Supp. III 1985). See generally Note, The Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 and Content Regulation of Cable Television, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 779 
(1984-1985). 
59. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406 (holding that an auction cre-
ated a serious risk that city officials would discriminate among franchise applicants be-
cause of the views or content in their proposed programs); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. 
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 
106 S. Ct. at 910 (finding that the Commission's order "discriminates on the basis of the 
viewpoints of the selected speakers"). 
60. See Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1054; see also Comment, supra note 48, at 1415-
16. 
61. 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act specifically addresses the con-
trol of "fallow time," which is time when the designated channels are not being used for 
their public access purposes. Section 61l(d) authorizes the franchising authority to pre-
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outside parties, such as the franchising authority or another gov-
ernmental entity, may restrict what goes on a public access 
channel.62 This may lead to editorial control by a governmental 
entity over access programming. The attempts by some commu-
nities to prevent the broadcasting of the access programs created 
by extremist groups clearly demonstrates the threat of such cen-
sorship.63 Furthermore, even if a community does not block the 
telecast, a cable operator may feel compelled to arrange addi-
tional programming to counter the extremist programs.64 Public 
scribe rules and procedures to allow the cable operator to use fallow time for nonaccess 
purposes until needed for public access purposes. Id. § 53l(d). The Cable Act thus cre-
ates a device for keeping PEG channels from going unused, which Congress believed 
would better serve the needs and interests of cable subscribers. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra 
note 7, at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws at 4684; see also Options 
for Cable Regulation Hearings, supra note 43, at 168 (statement of Charles Royer, Presi-
dent, National League of Cities) ("The public interest question is whether it is best to 
have noise or lines on a vacant channel or to have something on there."). 
62. The Cable Act authorizes the franchising authority, however, to establish the 
rules and procedures for using public access channels or channel capacity. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 531(b) (Supp. III 1985). In addition, the House Report explicitly states that the stat-
ute imposes no limitation "on a franchising authority's or other government entity's edi-
torial control over or use of channel capacity set aside for governmental purposes." H.R. 
REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
4684. 
63. See, e.g., Turner, Extremist Finds Cable TV ls Forum for Right-Wing Views, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1986, at A23, col. 1 (noting that the Pocatello (Idaho) Human Rela-
tions Council previewed the tape of "Race and Reason," produced by the White Ameri-
can Resistance, an organization led by a former Ku Klux Klan member, but "decided it 
was unable to block the telecast" because the franchise agreement only forbid the use of 
access programming for advertising and for displaying pornography); Ross, "And Now, a 
Word from the Klan ... ": ls Public-Access TV Working?, L.A. Daily J., May 16, 1985, at 
4, col. 1 (describing the former requirement by the City of Dallas that public access 
programming satisfy community standards before being permitted to air); see also Note, 
Quincy Cable and Its Effect on the Access Provisions of the 1984 Cable Act, 61 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 426, 439 n.105 (1986) (suggesting that Congress more narrowly tailor the 
Cable Act's access requirements by requiring the FCC to monitor cable broadcasting to 
assure access and diversity opportunities). 
Communities correctly hesitate to prevent extremist telecasts because of constitutional 
considerations. For example, in Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), 
the directors of a municipal theatre refused to allow a production of the musical "Hair" 
in their theatre because of their determination that the production would not be "in the 
best interest of the community." Id. at 548. The Supreme Court found this refusal un-
constitutional. See also Ciamporcero, supra note 26, at 376 (suggesting that it seems 
"unlikely" that a governmental body could retain editorial control over PEG channels). 
64. See Sibary, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 v. The First Amend-
ment, 7 COMM/ENT 381, 406-07 & n.201 (1984-1985) (explaining that a San Francisco 
cable operator felt it necessary to provide programming to counter the telecast of the 
"Race and Reason" series); Turner, supra note 63 (describing a call-in program con-
ducted by the Pocatello Human Relations Council following the "Race and Reason" tele-
cast); Ross, supra note 63 (noting the efforts of Austin Community Television to sched-
ule antiviolence programs and interviews with figures such as Stokely Carmichael and 
Ramsey Clark in order to counterbalance the right-wing broadcasts). 
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access requirements thus cost cable operators a considerable 
amount of control over their channels and expose access pro-
gramming to the risk of government censorship. 
In the debate over public access, the first amendment has a 
double-edged quality as both opponents and proponents of ac-
cess claim that, in theory, the Constitution protects their· inter-
ests. 611 While public access furthers the first amendment goals of 
enhancing the marketplace of ideas, fulfilling the democracy ra-
tionale, and promoting self-expression, it also intrudes upon the 
editorial discretion of cable operators by limiting their choice 
over the composition of their cable services. To resolve the ques-
tion of whether public access channels should be required, how-
ever, a more fundamental question must first be answered as to 
whether it is constitutional under the first amendment to regu-
late cable television. 
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CABLE REGULATION UNDER THE 
EXPANDED SCARCITY RATIONALE 
As the Berkshire case reveals, deciding the constitutionality of 
public access requirements necessarily requires determining 
whether cable television can be regulated at all under the first 
amendment.66 The Berkshire court used an analogy to broad-
casting and concluded that public access requirements fell under 
the umbrella of constitutionality established for the fairness 
doctrine. Courts and commentators have offered several theories 
in addition to the broadcasting analogy to justify and evaluate 
the regulation of cable television. These theories include the 
public disruption rationale,67 the public forum doctrine,68 the 
65. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Par-
tial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1976). 
66. See Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as 
moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985); Rice, Emerging Issues in Cable TV, in 3 THE CABLE/ 
BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BooK, supra note 10, at 81, 85 (stating that "[t]he debate 
on providing access is commingled with the classification of cable services"). 
67. Under the disruption of public property rationale, several courts have justified 
cable regulation because the installation of a cable system causes a disruption of public 
property. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377 (10th 
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. 
Supp. 801, 811 (W.D. Mich. 1985); cf. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 
694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting physical interference with "other users of tele-
phone poles and underground ducts"); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. 
Supp. 1553, 1564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hopkinsville Cable TV v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, 
562 F. Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982). Under this rationale, regulation of the cable 
medium is reasonable because the local government has a legitimate interest in limiting 
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the number of times that the installation of cable tears up its streets and inconveniences 
its citizens. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); Community Communications 
Co., 660 F.2d at 1378; Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985; see also Tele-Communication~ of 
Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1339 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Meyerson, supra 
note 46, at 27. Proponents of this view also argue that the cable wires constitute a "per-
manent visual blight" and that the installation process poses significant safety problems 
because of the resulting traffic delays and other hazards. Preferred Communications, 106 
S. Ct. at 2037. 
This rationale falters, however, because other forms of communication, such as news-
papers, also use public ways for distribution and other purposes, but are not subject to 
regulation. G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 106-10; Saylor, Commentary, Municipal Ripoff: 
The Unconstitutionality of Cable Television Franchise Fees and Access Support Pay-
ments, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 671, 695-96 (1986). Furthermore, even if cable television can 
be distinguished from other communications mediums, the public disruption rationale 
only supports regulation of the installation process when the government may be legiti-
mately concerned for the protection of its property and citizens. Requiring that installa-
tion take place within a certain period of time and that a bond be placed to ensure 
restoration of any damaged property could appropriately serve these government inter-
ests. Note, supra note 27, at 207. After installation, further regulation cannot be justified 
under the public disruption rationale. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("No doubt a municipality has some power to control the placement of 
newspaper vending machines. But any effort to use that power as the basis for dictating 
what must be placed in such machines would surely be invalid."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
2889 (1986); see also McDavid, The Eyesore War, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 
1985, at 10 (discussing the controversy over vending machine regulations). 
68. Under the public forum doctrine, the government may enforce certain regulations 
that limit access to governmental property depending upon the nature of that property. 
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). With 
traditional or designated public forums, the government may enforce content-neutral, 
narrowly-tailored time, place, and manner restrictions on speech to serve a significant 
governmental interest. Id. at 45. The government may impose content-based restrictions 
only when necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). For nonpublic forums, government 
restrictions on speech "need only be reasonable." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educ. Fund, 105 ,S. Ct. 3439, 3453 (1985) (emphasis in original). 
In the context of cable regulation, cable companies have used the public forum doc-
trine when seeking access to government property-utility poles and conduits-to pro-
vide cable services. See, e.g., Tele-Communications, 757 F.2d at 1337-38 (finding that 
the complaint-alleging "no reasons, practical or legal" for government restrictions on 
access to public rights-of-way by a cable company-adequately stated a first amendment 
cause of action under any form of the public forum doctrine) (emphasis in original); 
Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1407-09 (using the public forum doctrine as an 
"aid" in its first amendment analysis without conclusively determinir.g which category of 
the public forum doctrine characterized the utility poles and conduits in the case); see 
also G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 175-84; Note, Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City 
of Los Angeles: Impact on the First Amendment Rights of Cable Television Companies, 
35 CATH. U.L. REV. 851, 874-80 (1986); Recent Developments, supra note 54, at 674-86. 
But see G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 111-22 (rejecting the characterization of cable sys-
tems as public forums because cable systems are privately-owned and because such a 
characterization would ignore the editorial discretion of cable operators). 
In the context of cable regulation, however, the usefulness of the public forum doctrine 
is limited because exclusions from public forums may be invalid if a person denied access 
cannot speak effectively elsewhere. See Tele-Communications, 757 F.2d at 1339 n.4; see 
also Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3453; Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
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common carrier model,69 the O'Brien standard,70 the functional 
cent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry, 
460 U.S. at 45; Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 646, 
654-55 (1981); Barnett, supra note 49, at 43. The District of Columbia Circuit observed 
that the situation of cable operators differs from that of other speakers because the cable 
television medium "often requires the use of government-owned property in order to 
communicate." Tele-Communications, 757 F.2d at 1339 n.4 (emphasis in original). Here, 
"the 'particular piece' of government property forms the crucial gateway to an entire 
[communications] medium." Barnett, supra note 49, at 43 (footnote omitted). Conse-
quently, cable regulation does not fit comfortably within the public forum doctrine be-
cause the government's denial of access to the medium does not leave the operator with 
an alternative place to speak. But see Note, supra, at 879-80 (arguing that, under Corne-
lius, the use of another cable company's wiring to transmit programming represents a 
reasonable alternative). 
Finally, the use of the public forum doctrine to evaluate restrictions on access to gov-
ernment property could lead, more generally, to the adoption of the public forum doc-
trine as the first amendment standard for all cable regulation. This development would 
be troublesome for two reasons. First, the categorization of the particular government 
property involved-utility poles and conduits-may be a very difficult task. The Tele-
Communications and Preferred Communications cases reveal that it is not clear whether 
such government property should be categorized as a traditional public forum, a public 
forum by designation, or a nonpublic forum. See also G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 178-
80. Second, the public forum doctrine was developed to address the first amendment 
claims of speakers seeking access to government property. Thus, it is not clear that the 
underlying rationale and standards for this doctrine are appropriate for resolving the 
first amendment issues involved in other cable regulations-such as PEG require-
ments-that do not concern the initial issue of access to government property. Further-
more, the public forum doctrine represents a "geographical" approach to first amend-
ment analysis in which the location of a speaker determines the outcome of a case. See 
Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Con-
text in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1220 (1984). This approach 
seems particularly inappropriate as the first amendment standard for an entire commu-
nications medium because it allows constitutional protection to depend upon a speaker's 
physical location, and not upon an evaluation of the relevant first amendment considera-
tions. Id. at 1234 ("[T]he first amendment 'protects people, not places.' Constitutional 
protection should depend not on labeling the speaker's physical location but on the first 
amendment values and governmental interests involved in the case.") (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
69. Under the common carrier rationale, commentators have argued that the cable 
medium should be treated as a "common carrier." This analysis views cable as a mere 
conduit that lacks any editorial control over the programming it carries. Like other com-
munications common carriers, such as telephone systems and communications satellites, 
cable would have to provide services at reasonable rates on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
Comment, Functional Classification, supra note 31, at 535-40; see also SLOAN CoMM'N 
ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 9, at 146-48; Spitzer, Controlling the Content of 
Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1349, 1401 (1985). According to Professor 
Spitzer, the advantages of this system are that "[t]he broadcaster would have neither the 
ability nor the incentive to blunt criticism of the government or fail to cover contro-
versy." Id. at 1402. 
To date, no court has accepted the common carrier rationale for cable regulation. 
Comment, Functional Classification, supra note 31, at 535. This rationale assumes that 
the cable operators, in choosing programming for their services, exercise no editorial dis-
cretion that the first amendment must protect. Courts have not accepted such a limited 
view of the editorial responsibility of the cable operator. See supra notes 52-56 and ac-
companying text; see also Comment, Economic Scarcity, supra note 31, at 260 ("The 
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characterization of cable as a conduit simply does not reflect the technological advances 
in cablecasting."); Fein, Constitutional Cloud Cast over Cable Regulation, LEGAL TIMES, 
June 16, 1986, at 10, cols. 1, 2. ("[The Preferred Communications case) categorically 
rejected ... a widespread view that cable television could be regulated on a par with 
non-communication enterprises, such as pipelines or taxi companies .... "). Accordingly, 
because the common carrier model proposes to divest operators of editorial discretion, 
the rationale offers little promise. 
Finally, it is unclear that public access regulations would pass constitutional muster 
even if cable were categorized as a common carrier because of the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 106 S. Ct. 903 
(1986). The Supreme Court held that a California Public Utilities Commission order re-
quiring a privately-owned utility company to include speech of a third party-with 
which the utility disagrees-in its billing envelopes violated the utility's first amendment 
rights. Id. at 914. 
70. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Several courts have used the 
O'Brien first amendment standard for symbolic speech to evaluate the reasonableness of 
cable regulations. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038 (citing O'Brien 
for the proposition that "where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of ac-
tion, the First Amendment values must be balanced against competing social interests," 
but refusing to evaluate the first amendment complaint at issue without a fuller develop-
ment of the disputed issues in the case); see also Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 
1434, 1450-54 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Preferred Communi-
cations, 754 F.2d at 1405-07; Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48 (D.C. Cir.) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. 
Supp. 801, 810 (W.D. Mich. 1985); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 987 
(D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985); Note, supra note 63, at 439 
(arguing that "O'Brien furnishes a fitting first amendment framework for cable"). 
O'Brien established a two-track approach to first amendment analysis. On the first track, 
when a regulation does not aim at the· communicative impact of a cable operator's 
speech-i.e., as when regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech-the court 
balances the government's interest in regulation against the infringement on first amend-
ment rights. The court asks whether the restriction furthers substantial governmental 
interests and whether the restriction is sufficiently tailored-"no greater than is essen-
tial"-to suit those interests. On the second track, when the government regulation con-
cerns the communicative impact of an operator's speech, the court applies a strict level 
of scrutiny. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 580-84 (1978). 
In Berkshire, for example, the court upheld the public access regulations because they 
served substantial governmental interests in promoting community participation in cable 
television programming and production, and in producing a more informed public. 571 F. 
Supp. at 987-88. Furthermore, the court deemed the incidental restriction on the rights 
of cable operators to be a "minimal intrusion" that was no greater than was "essential" 
to further the government's objectives. Id. at 988. 
The use of the O'Brien test in the context of cable regulation is problematic. See 
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453 (expressing "serious doubts" about the appropriateness of us-
ing O'Brien's interest-balancing formulation to examine the constitutionality of the 
FCC's must-carry rules); see also Note, supra note 68, at 872-74. For example, the char-
acterization of access regulation-as aimed, or not aimed, at the communicative impact 
of an operator's speech-will inevitably vary according to the viewpoint of the speaker. 
See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1451-52; Note, supra note 68, at 873-74. See generally Ely, Flag 
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-97 (1975). The government will argue 
that its restrictions are unrelated to the communicative impact of the cable operator's 
speech, hut, rather, seek to minimize disruption of public property and promote free 
expression through the provision of public access channels. In contrast, cable operators 
will argue that regulations, such as public access restrictions, necessarily are intended to 
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approach,71 and the scarcity rationale.72 Of these various theo-
ries, the scarcity rationale stands out as the most persuasive be-
cause it provides a sound basis for government regulation of 
cable television. 
To date, the Supreme Court has accepted physical scarcity as 
the only form of scarcity that will justify regulation of a commu-
nications medium. For example, the Court upheld broadcast reg-
ulation because of the physical scarcity of broadcast frequencies 
and the need to prevent chaos on the public airwaves.73 In con-
trast, the Court explicitly rejected the economic scarcity ration-
ale as a justification for the regulation of newspapers. 74 In Berk-
shire, however, the court asserted that the source of 
scarcity-physical, economic, or legal-should be irrelevant to 
the question of whether the government may regulate the cable 
medium. Instead, the court expanded the scarcity rationale and 
stated that regulation of a communications medium should be 
suppress some of their speech and therefore warrant strict scrutiny. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 
1451-54; Carlson, 601 F. Supp. at 810. 
The O'Brien standard thus presents an unsatisfactory analysis for evaluating cable 
regulation because it does not answer the difficult question of how access and other regu-
lations should be objectively classified. Perhaps more importantly, it also offers no expla-
nation for why even this minimal regulation is justified under the first amendment. 
71. Another recent proposal for justifying cable regulation is the functional approach, 
which argues that the cable medium should be divided and regulated according to its 
different functions. Comment, Functional Classification, supra note 31, at 540-43; see 
also CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 16, at 20 (recommending 
adoption of policy separating ownership/control of distribution facilities from ownership/ 
control of programming); Comment, Public Access, supra note 31, at 118 (noting the 
wide variety of functions performed by cable systems). One approach would divide the 
cable medium into two functions: a programming function and a distribution function. 
For the first function, a cable operator's programming would be accorded first amend-
ment protection and government regulation of this programming would be prohibited. 
For the second function, where the cable operator acts merely as a distributor of cable 
services-akin to a common carrier-government regulation, including public access re-
quirements, would be appropriate and permitted. Cf. Meyerson, supra note 46, at 26 
(contrasting the cable operator's roles as producer and distributor). 
The functional approach fails to provide an adequate rationale, however, because it 
does not explain why regulation of a cable operator's distribution function is constitu-
tional under the first amendment. 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 75-92. 
73. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court upheld the 
FCC's imposition of the fairness doctrine on broadcasters. The Court argued that broad-
cast frequencies constitute "a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rational-
ized only by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of 
little use because of the cacaphony [sic] of competing voices, none of which could be 
clearly and predictably heard." Id. at 376; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 
U.S. 364, 376-78 (1984); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
74. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court struck 
down a Florida statute that granted a political candidate a right to reply to criticism in 
the newspaper. The Court found that the statute "fail[ed] to clear the barriers of the 
First Amendment because of its intrusion into the functions of editors." Id. at 258. 
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permitted when the effect of scarcity is "to remove from all but 
a small group an important means of expressing ideas. "75 
A. Three Versions of the Scarcity Rationale 
The Berkshire court identified three possible sources of scar-
city-physical, economic, and legal-in a communications me-
dium. Each source provides a separate basis for justifying cable 
regulation under the court's expanded scarcity rationale. 
1. Physical scarcity- Under one version of the scarcity ra-
tionale, cable television can be regulated because, like broadcast 
airwaves, the cable medium constitutes a physically scarce pub-
lic resource. As examples of scarcity, this rationale cites the po-
tentially limited space available in the streets for cables and on 
utility poles for cable wires.76 Courts generally have rejected this 
rationale.77 In Preferred Communications v. City of Los Ange-
75. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 986-87. 
76. See Meyerson, supra note 46, at 27; Note, supra note 27, at 209; Comment, Func-
tional Classification, supra note 31, at 534; see also Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo 
Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (admitting that "there may be some prac-
tical limit to the number of coaxial cables that may be hung from utility poles or buried 
underground," but refusing to apply the physical scarcity rationale because the defend-
ants did not prove the existence of physical scarcity in the instant case); cf. Black Hills 
Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying the physical scarcity ra-
tionale to CATV (community antenna television) because these systems use radio 
signals). 
A narrow definition of this rationale would look at physical scarcity only in terms of 
the means by which cable television communicates-through coaxial cables. Under this 
view, cable television might not constitute a scarce physical resource because "cable is 
not limited to a finite number of channels the way broadcasting is," and thus regulation 
would not be required to prevent interference with the use of these channels. See Com-
munity Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1113 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. 
Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Jones, 800 F.2d at 1001 
(Baldock, J., specially concurring); Saylor, supra note 67, at 681; Comment, The Spec-
trum Scarcity Doctrine: A Constitutional Anachronism, 39 Sw. L.J. 827, 833 n.64 (1986). 
This Note, however, adopts a broader definition of scarcity that examines the physical 
limitations and interferences with the provision of cable services, such as the limitation 
on utility pole space for cables, to determine whether physical scarcity exists in the cable 
medium. This broader view accords with the underlying rationale in Red Lion for ac-
cepting physical scarcity as a justification for broadcast regulation-permitting regula-
tion of a communications medium to prevent interference with the public's use of that 
resource. 
77. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that the 
"essential precondition of ... physical interference and scarcity ... is absent") (citing 
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 
(1977)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); accord Preferred Communications v. City of 
Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) (calling Black Hills "doubtful prece-
dent"), aff'd and. remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of 
Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982); Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 
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Les, 78 the Ninth Circuit recently held that physical scarcity does 
not exist when the space on the poles and in the conduits is 
physically capable of accommodating another cable. 79 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court narrowly affirmed the circuit court decision, 
but remanded the case for a fuller development of the factual 
record including "the present uses of the public utility poles and 
rights-of-way and how [the cable company] proposes to install 
and maintain its facilities on them."80 The Court thus left open 
the possibility that the physical scarcity rationale could be used 
to justify cable regulation if the factual record proved the exis-
tence of scarcity. 
2. Economic scarcity- Courts have adopted a second ver-
sion of the scarcity rationale, which argues that a cable system 
constitutes a "natural monopoly" because only one system can 
operate efficiently and profitably in a given community.81 One 
firm can supply the entire cable system at a lower cost than 
could more than one firm. The initial expenses for starting a 
cable firm, such as the costs for establishing the distribution sys-
tem, run extremely high and do not change substantially accord-
ing to the number of subscribers to a cable system. The cable 
medium under this model constitutes another scarce public re-
source, like broadcast frequencies, thus justifying government 
regulation. 82 
Commentators have criticized the economic scarcity rationale 
by arguing that scarcity does not exist in the cable medium be-
cause cable franchises do not constitute true monopolies. Critics 
1025, 1054 n.71 (8th Cir. 1978) (limiting Black Hills to its facts), a/f'd on other grounds, 
440 U.S. 689 (1979); Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1563 n.19; see also Sibary, supra note 
64, at 398; Note, supra note 27, at 209-10. 
78. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). 
79. Id. at 1404; see also Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp. 801, 811 n.9 
(W.D. Mich. 1985). 
80. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038. 
81. Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that because the city's cable television market constituted a natural monopoly, 
such that only one operator could provide service at a time, the city could offer an exclu-
sive franchise); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-
79 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Carlson, 601 F. Supp. at 811 
(using economic scarcity argument to "buttress" village's primary interest in preventing 
disruption of public domain); Berkshire, 571 F.2d at 985-86; Hopkinsville Cable TV v. 
Pennyroyal Cablevision, 562 F.Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982); see also CABINET COMM. 
ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 16, at 10; Meyerson, supra note 46, at 6-10; Com-
ment, Functional Classification, supra note 31, at 534; cf. Omega Satellite Prods., 694 
F.2d at 127-28 (stating that economic scarcity may provide a rationale for regulation of 
entry into a market); Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1563-64 (refusing to decide the con-
stitutional issue of whether economic scarcity justifies cable regulation because the court 
had "no facts or expert opinion upon which to make such a determination"). 
82. Meyerson, supra note 46, at 7-8. 
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assert that the relevant market should be defined to include all 
forms of communications, and that cable television cannot rep-
resent a true monopoly because it does not have monopoly 
power over all communications. 83 This argument underestimates 
the difference in impact of the various media-broadcasting, 
print, and cable-and ignores the importance that the particular 
mode of expression may have for a speaker. 84 
A second criticism asserts that the characterization of cable 
systems as natural monopolies rests upon an unproven assump-
tion that cable operators are in a position to make monopoly 
profits.811 Yet this criticism can be countered with proof showing 
that a cable system operates as a natural monopoly.86 In commu-
nities that confer an exclusive franchise upon a single cable com-
pany, the proof is self-evident.87 In communities where some 
competition still exists, evidence may prove the limited nature 
of this competition. 88 Although a community with several cable 
systems may accurately be deemed to have an oligopoly, rather 
than a monopoly, the problem of scarcity in the cable medium 
would remain. 89 
3. Legal scarcity- The Berkshire court identified a third 
form of scarcity-"legal scarcity." When a franchising authority 
confers exclusive rights to provide cable services to one or more 
cable companies, the cable medium may be labelled a "legal" 
scarcity because "other potential speakers, even those with suffi-
cient funds to establish their own cable systems, would be shut 
out of the market, in this case, by law."90 The usefulness of this 
argument is limited. Legal scarcity offers only an after-the-fact 
justification that the creation of a limited number of franchises 
supports regulation. This form of scarcity "merely begs the 
83. Saylor, supra note 67, at 679; Note, supra note 27, at 198; Comment, Economic 
Scarcity, supra note 31, at 264 n.117. 
84. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
85. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 
S. Ct. 2889 (1986); see also Note, supra note 63, at 436 n.92. 
86. See, e.g., Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711, 717 & 
n.6 (8th Cir. 1986). 
87. The Quincy court noted, for instance, that the monopolistic position of cable sys-
tems may solely be the result of an exclusive franchise conferred by the government. 768 
F.2d at 1450; see also G. SHAPIRO. supra note 47, at 9-12. In this situation, the cable 
medium may be characterized as both economically and legally scarce. See infra notes 
90-92 and accompanying text. 
88. Cf. Meyerson, supra note 46, at 10 ("[T]here is no evidence that such competition 
can ever involve more than an extremely limited number of competitors."). 
89. See id. 
90. Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 987 n.10 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated 
as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). 
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question" of whether the initial government regulation was 
justified. 91 
Accordingly, the legal scarcity argument does not offer a per-
suasive basis for justifying cable regulation. Physical and eco-
nomic scarcity, however, present strong justifications for cable 
regulation, although proving scarcity may be more difficult in 
the context of physical scarcity than in the context of economic 
scarcity. 92 
B. Advantages of the Scarcity Rationale 
Berkshire's expanded scarcity rationale represents a novel ap-
proach to the issue of cable regulation that has several impor-
tant advantages. By examining the effect of scarcity, rather than 
its source, the Berkshire court offered a consistent rationale that 
addresses the important first amendment problem of concentra-
tion in a communications medium and provides a justification 
for regulation based upon the unique characteristics of cable 
television. 
1. Theoretical coherency- Because of its novelty, cable tele-
vision presents an opportunity to shed the fallacies of the cur-
rent form of the scarcity rationale used by courts. 93 The focus by 
91. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). 
92. See generally Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1003 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, 
J., specially concurring) (noting that "(t]he legal determination about the first amend-
ment status of cable television depends somewhat upon an evidentiary basis"); supra 
notes 78-80 & 85-88 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. The Quincy court further "observed 
that technological advances may have rendered the 'scarcity rationale' obsolete even for 
broadcasters." Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cita-
tion omitted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); see also FCC v. League of Women 
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984) (noting increasing criticism of the spectrum scarcity 
rationale for the regulation of broadcasting, but refusing to reconsider its approach 
"without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have 
advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be 
required"). 
The abandonment of the current form of the scarcity rationale has also been advo-
cated by several commentators. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 70, § 12-22, at 699 ("The 
clear failure of the 'technological scarcity' argument as applied to cable television 
amounts to an invitation to reconsider the tension between the Supreme Court's radi-
cally divergent approaches to the print and electronic media.") (footnote omitted); Bol-
linger, supra note 65, at 42 ("[P]erhaps cable offers the Court an appropriate occasion 
for discarding the shibboleth of the scarcity rationale."); Comment, supra note 76, at 
832-38 (arguing that developments in modern technology, such as DBS (Direct Broad-
cast Satellite), digital techniques, low-power television, and compression techniques, un-
dermine the assumptions concerning scarcity in the electromagnetic spectrum); id. at 836 
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courts on the question of whether the scarcity in a medium can 
be characterized as physical, thus justifying government regula-
tion, has led to an illogical and inconsistent distinction between 
the print and broadcast media in communications law.94 One 
court has stated that scarcity "can hardly explain regulation in 
one context and not another" because it constitutes a universal 
fact. 911 To a certain extent, all physical resources can be charac-
terized as scarce.96 For example, while the broadcast medium re-
lies upon the limited public airwaves, newspapers also depend 
upon a limited supply of natural resources, such as trees for pa-
per. The universal characteristic of scarcity thus requires that 
courts and legislatures choose the degree of scarcity that they 
will require before allowing the regulation of a communications 
medium. By continuing to use only the physical form of the 
scarcity rationale, courts and legislatures have avoided this 
decision. 
In contrast, under its expanded scarcity rationale, the Berk-
shire court explicitly identified the degree of scarcity that it 
would require to justify government regulation. The court stated 
that a communications medium may be regulated when the ef-
fect of scarcity is to remove an important means of expression 
from the reach of most people.97 Berkshire's rationale, unlike the 
current form of the scarcity rationale, offers a consistent theory 
that addresses the appropriateness of regulating communica-
tions media. 
2. The first amendment problem of concentration of con-
trol- Berkshire's broader definition of scarcity shifts the atten-
tion of courts and legislatures away from the source of scarcity 
in a communications medium and enables them to address an 
("The view that the electromagnetic spectrum is very limited springs from assumptions 
of outdated technology."); Spitzer, supra note 69, at 1403-04 ("Technological progress 
will also blur the distinction between print and broadcast .... [For example, a newspa-
per video soon may be possible, and] ... in the near future, print and video will blend 
into one another. The blurring of the boundary will make dual systems of content con-
trol increasingly arbitrary and unjustifiable."); id. at 1353 n.10 (noting that the treat-
ment of the press in this country could originally have been different, as· we could have 
had a Federal Paper Commission (FPC) to license newspapers, magazines, and other 
printed material). 
94. See Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he basic difficulty ... is that the line drawn between 
the print and broadcast media, resting as it does on the physical scarcity of the latter, is 
a distinction without a difference"). 
95. Id. (footnote omitted). 
96. Id.; Note, supra note 27, at 189-90 n.55 ("The inherent fallacy of the scarcity 
rationale is that it applies to just about everything."). 
97. Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986-87 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated 
as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). 
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important first amendment problem. Under the Berkshire anal-
ysis, the effect of scarcity must be examined to determine 
whether it justifies regulation. The court's explanation of the re-
quired effect-"when scarcity removes an important means of 
expression"-actually describes the problem of concentration of 
control in a communications medium. Such concentration 
presents a clear danger to first amendment interests because it 
increases the risk that vast power will be given to the owner of a 
medium, thus allowing the owner to restrict the speech of others 
at will. 98 With too much control, the owner may interfere exces-
sively with the speech of others, block the expression of minority 
viewpoints, or simply distort public debate with one-sided 
presentations of controversies. 99 Berkshire's expanded scarcity 
rationale would allow the government to regulate this private 
control in a medium and thus further the goals of the first 
amendment. 
3. A regulatory model for cable television- Finally, Berk-
shire's broader scarcity rationale offers an alternative to the 
traditional regulatory models of broadcasting and print-a the-
ory that justifies cable regulation on the basis of the unique 
characteristics of the cable medium. 10° For many courts, catego-
rizing cable as akin either to print or to broadcasting has become 
the accepted method for determining whether, and to what ex-
tent, cable may be regulated under the first amendment. Under 
the model comparing cable television to newspapers, any govern-
ment regulation constitutes a violation of the first amendment's 
98. See Bollinger, supra note 6, at 297-98; Meyerson, supra note 46, at 31 ("If there 
is only one owner of all those channels, there is only one outlet for cable programming 
and only one operator deciding what will appear on cable television.") (footnote omit-
ted); see also CABINET CoMM. ON CABLE CoMMUNICATJONS, supra note 16, at 19-20; Bar-
ron, supra note 46, at 1644-45; Carter, Mass Media: How Responsible, How Free?, 39 
ARK. L. REV. 297, 308 (1985) (citing the danger that the current trend toward ownership 
and centralization of control of the mass media presents to the first amendment); Com-
ment, supra note 76, at 838-39. The House Report on the Cable Act itself emphasized 
that one of the greatest challenges for establishing a cable policy "has been assuring 
access to the electronic media by people other than the licensees or owners of those 
media. The development of cable television, with its abundance of channels, can provide 
the public and program providers the meaningful access that, up until now, has been 
difficult to obtain." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 4667. 
99. In the Miami Herald case, the Court stated that "the result of the vast accumula-
tions of unreviewable power in the modern media empire" was likely to be "abuses of 
bias and manipulative reportage." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 250 (1974). 
100. See Comment, Public Access, supra note 31, at 118-19 ("The first amendment 
rights of community members would best be served by the development of a constitu-
tional standard which recognizes the uniqueness of the cable medium.") (footnote 
omitted). 
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guarantee of freedom of speech and press. 101 In contrast, when 
courts, as in Berkshire, analogize cable to broadcasting, regula-
tion does not violate the first amendment.102 Several courts have 
relied on the common features of cable and broadcast television 
to conclude that the two should be treated similarly. Broadcast-
ing and cable share a similar method of presentation and a his-
tory of government regulation that distinguish these two media 
from print.103 First, cable "looks" like broadcasting because both 
media use the television screen to reach viewers. 10" Second, just 
as the Cable Act requires cable operators to obtain a franchise 
before providing cable service to subscribers, the Communica-
tions Act requires that a broadcasting license be obtained before 
a person may own or operate a television station.1011 In contrast, 
newspapers and television do not share the same appearance, 
nor has one ever had to obtain government permission to start a 
newspaper. 
The superficial similarity between cable and broadcasting, 
however, blurs finer distinctions between the two media that 
have important first amendment consequences.106 For example, 
the cable operator oversees a spectrum of channels, unlike the 
broadcaster, who is limited to the presentation of one channel at 
a time. The large number of channels available allows the cable 
101. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978) (dic-
tum), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 
F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). But see Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981) (re-
jecting the newspaper analogy for cable television), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); 
Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985 (D.R.I. 1983) ("Newspapers and 
cable television cannot be equated."), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). 
102. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1377-80; Berkshire, 571 F. 
Supp. at 986-87; see also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 
2034, 2037 (1986) ("Respondent's proposed activities would seem to implicate First 
Amendment interests as do the activities of wireless broadcasters, which were found to 
fall within the ambit of the First Amendment in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC ... 
. ") (citation omitted). But see Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448-50 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (rejecting the comparison of cable television to conventional broadcasting), 
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 
1099, 1112-13 (D. Utah 1985) (distinguishing the cable and broadcast media), aff'd sub 
nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986). 
103. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985. 
104. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448 ("From the perspective of the viewer, no doubt, cable 
and broadcast television appear virtually indistinguishable."); Jones, 800 F.2d at 1004 
(Baldock, J., specially concurring); see also Meyerson, supra note 46, at 29. 
105. Cable Act § 621(b), 47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (Supp. III 1985); Communications Act of 
1934, 47 u.s.c. § 301 (1982). 
106. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 
1985), a/f'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); Comment, Public Access, supra note 
31, at 118. 
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operator to present a variety of issues simultaneously and thus 
to provide a more diverse array of programming than is possible 
on one broadcaster's channel. 107 This variety accords with the 
first amendment's goal of promoting diversity of expression.108 
The differences between the cable, broadcasting, and print 
media should thus be acknowledged by courts and legislatures to 
avoid automatically classifying cable television under the tradi-
tional print or broadcasting regulatory models. 109 More impor-
tantly, the novelty of cable offers an opportunity for courts and 
legislatures to assess the policies that should guide this new 
communications medium. 110 Such an assessment would accord 
with the Supreme Court's admonitions that each medium of ex-
pression should be judged by first amendment standards specifi-
cally suited to that medium, m and that differences between me-
dia justify distinct first amendment standards.112 
107. See Comment, Public Access, supra note 31, at ll8; see also Meyerson, supra 
note 46, at 26-27 ("Newspaper readers can turn the page to a different article; cable 
subscribers can switch the channel.") (footnote omitted); Comment, Functional Classifi-
cation, supra note 31, at 533. Cf. CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 
16, at 34 n.6 (noting that newspapers have an advantage over broadcast television be-
cause their articles can be read at any time). 
In Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700-01 (1984), the Supreme Court noted 
that cable and broadcasting are also based on totally different entrepreneurial principles 
because cable relies on subscribers for revenues, while broadcasting relies on 
advertisements. 
Finally, in addition to a general variety of programs, cable television offers an opportu-
nity for "narrowcasting"-programming targeted at particular social groups such as reli-
gious, ethnic, deaf, or other groups. Meyerson, supra note 46, at 14; Minenberg, supra 
note 46, at 591; Comment, Public Access, supra note 31, at ll9 n.187. 
108. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
109. See Note, supra note 47, at 124; see also Comment, Functional Classification, 
supra note 31, at 538 n.109 ("Because the categorization of cable is such an important 
policy issue, the appropriate decision-maker should be the body responsible for ultimate 
policy choices in a democracy-the legislature."). 
110. See Bollinger, supra note 6, at 296; Bazelon, The First Amendment and the 
"New Media"-New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. CoMM. L.J. 
201, 211 (1979). In Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038, Justice Blackmun, in 
his concurrence, expressed a similar concern: 
Different communications media are treated differently for First Amendment 
purposes .... In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable access, the 
Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable television make it suf-
ficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an already ex-
isting standard or whether those characteristics require a new analysis. 
111. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of 
expression ... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it 
.... "); accord Tele-Communications of Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1338-
39 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 
1403 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). 
112. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); accord FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 
503 (1952); see also Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. 
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The advantages of Berkshire's expanded scarcity rationale 
clearly suggest that it should be used to regulate the cable me-
dium. The rationale not only takes into account the unique 
characteristics of cable television, but it also offers a consistent 
theory that addresses the first amendment problem of concen-
tration of control over a communications medium. 
C. Distinguishing the Nonregulation of Newspapers 
Opponents of cable regulation have argued that cable's natu-
ral monopoly characteristics should not be sufficient to justify 
regulation because the Supreme Court rejected the economic 
scarcity rationale in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 113 
This criticism assumes that communications mediums with simi-
lar characteristics of economic scarcity must be treated simi-
larly.114 For instance, if franchise agreements require cable oper-
ators to provide public access, newspapers must provide space, 
even additional pages, for public access. m 
Several important reasons exist for continuing to permit the 
freedom of newspapers, while allowing the regulation of both 
cable and broadcast television. First, newspapers perform a sym-
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403; Home Box 
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 43 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 
(1977); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 980 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as 
moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). 
113. 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see also Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450; Home Box Office, 567 
F.2d at 46; G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 122-23; Note, supra note 63, at 436 n.92; Note, 
supra note 27, at 204-05; Comment, Economic Scarcity, supra note 31, at 264. The gov-
ernment, however, may subject newspapers to certain types of "noneditorial" regulation. 
For example, "[n]ondiscriminatory application of general laws to the business aspects of 
publishing has been given constitutional approval, even though enforcement may have 
the indirect effect of lessening a publisher's ability to disseminate information." Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377 n.7 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(emphasis in original), cert. dismissed, 456 -U.S. 1001 (1982). In addition, newspapers are 
subject to antitrust laws, Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); labor relations laws, Associated 
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); equal protection laws, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); and "ordinary forms of taxa-
tion," Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). The vending machine 
debate illustrates another example of the regulation of newspapers. See supra note 67. 
114. See, e.g., Comment, Economic Scarcity, supra note 31, at 267 (arguing that be-
cause economic scarcity is present in all media, supporting "government-enforced access 
on this basis threatens the historical interpretation of the first amendment"). 
115. See id. at 249 ("Constitutional historians and lay-persons alike would be 
alarmed if the United States Government seized five pages of the New York Times in an 
attempt to increase public access to the media."); see also Saylor, supra note 67, at 671-
72 (depicting a similar parade of horribles). 
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bolic function within American society as representatives of "the 
press."116 This symbolism provides a historical link between 
newspapers and traditional first amendment values of prohibit-
ing government interference with the press. 117 Newspapers are 
viewed as society's tool for implementing the first amendment 
principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open."116 Attachment to the symbolism of 
newspapers also explains society's hesitancy to end nonregula-
tion and its acceptance of the current regulatory scheme. The 
regulation of cable and broadcasting-newer technologies that 
have not shared the symbolic tradition of newspapers-does not 
seem as outrageous or threatening to first amendment notions of 
a free press.119 
This image of newspapers, like many symbols, is illusory be-
cause it overlooks the possible sources of censorship in American 
society. Although the government does not regulate newspapers, 
private control of the medium often works as effectively to limit 
(censor) speech.120 With no right of access to newspapers, the 
public can be denied an opportunity to speak through that print 
medium. If, under the scarcity rationale, concentration of con-
trol over a communications medium justifies government regula-
tion, then continuing the nonregulation of newspapers appears 
nonsensical. 
Yet allowing the government to regulate every communica-
tions medium that satisfies the scarcity rationale would lead to 
an equally absurd situation. In all likelihood, the government 
would be able to regulate cable television, broadcasting, and 
newspapers under the scarcity rationale, thus leaving no sector 
of the press unregulated. This result would eviscerate the princi-
ples of the first amendment. The symbolic importance of news-
papers presents a clear alternative to this situation by providing 
a rationale for continuing the nonregulation of newspapers. 
The continuation of the current system may also reflect a rec-
ognition of the difficulties inherent in devising a new system of 
regulation and a legitimate fear of letting the government get 
involved in any regulatory scheme.121 For instance, an alterna-
116. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 921 (1986) 
{Rehnquist, J., dissenting) {noting that corporations have not played "the historic role of 
newspapers as conveyors of individual ideas and opinion"). 
117. See Bollinger, supra note 65, at 33. 
118. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1974). 
119. See generally Bollinger, supra note 6; Bazelon, supra note 110. 
120. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-51 (1974). 
121. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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tive system could divide each medium·into regulated and unreg-
ulated sections, rather than follow the current division along me-
dia lines. 122 The unregulated sections would warrant the fullest · 
first amendment protection, while the regulated sections would 
merit less protection. Giving Congress or the courts the power to 
decide which parts of each medium should be regulated, how-
ever, would cede ultimate control over the entire press to the 
government and depart sharply from the concept of a free 
press.123 
Finally, the current partial regulatory scheme has another im-
portant advantage. To the extent that any concentration of con-
trol allows, 124 newspapers may act as a forum of last resort in the 
communications media. Free of government regulation, newspa-
pers may provide a check on censorship and an open forum for 
the discussion of governmental abuses. 1211 
Ironically, then, the current dual system of censor-
ship-governmental and private-may offer the most effective 
method for preserving freedom of the press because it prevents 
any one entity from achieving full control over the communica-
tions media. Thus, the symbolic importance of newspapers as a 
"free press" and the difficulty of devising a new regulatory sys-
tem provide forceful reasons for treating media, with similar 
characteristics of economic scarcity, differently. 
Berkshire's expanded scarcity rationale thus should be used to 
justify cable regulation because it allows courts and legislatures 
to address the underlying communications policies and goals of 
the first amendment. Berkshire's rationale avoids the illogical 
distinction between broadcast regulation and the nonregulation 
of newspapers under the current form of the scarcity rationale 
122. See Spitzer, supra note 69, at 1390. The functional approach presents another 
example of such an alternative system. See supra note 71. Yet even among commenta-
tors advocating a functional approach, no unanimity exists as to the number of func-
tions-two or three-that the cable medium serves. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 46, 
at 26 (discussing two functions-producing and distributing-of the cable operator); 
Comment, Functional Classification, supra note 31, at 540 (separating the functions of 
cable into three categories: where cable operators (1) cablecast their own programming, 
and thus, like newspapers, cannot be regulated; (2) offer programming produced by other 
services, and thus, like broadcasting, can be regulated; and (3) carry local broadcasters' 
signals or provide public access channels, and thus should be regulated as common carri-
ers); see also CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 16, at 21 (distin-
guishing three functions of the mass media: (1) creating or compiling information or en-
tertainment, (2) selecting or editing information, and (3) transmitting and distributing 
information to the public). 
123. See Note, supra note 47, at 136. 
124. See supra notes 98-99 & 120 and accompanying text. 
125. See Bollinger, supra note 65, at 32-35. 
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and justifies regulation on the basis of the unique characteristics 
of cable television. Furthermore, the expanded scarcity rationale 
answers the first amendment problem of concentration of con-
trol in a communications medium by requiring government regu-
lation. Although government regulation itself threatens first 
amendment principles, an exception to the scarcity rationale 
should continue to be made for newspapers because of their 
symbolic importance and because this system preserves an un-
regulated sphere of the communications media. 
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS DEBATE 
Under Berkshire's expanded scarcity rationale, public access 
requirements are clearly constitutional. This rationale justifies 
cable regulation when the effect of scarcity in the cable medium, 
regardless of its source, is to remove an important means of ex-
pression from all but a small group. Public access requirements 
not only represent a subset of constitutional cable regulation 
under this rationale, but also fulfill the rationale's underlying 
policy of preventing concentration of control by furthering the 
goals of the first amendment: promoting self-expression, enhanc-
ing the m_arketplace of ideas, and fulfilling the democracy 
rationale. 126 
Public access requirements also represent a sensible compro-
mise of the conflict between the first amendment interests of 
cable operators and the public.127 Access requirements further 
the public's first amendment interests, and, unlike other cable 
regulations, do not threaten to compromise severely the cable 
126. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
127. The Supreme Court recently suggested the use of a balancing approach in City 
of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2038 (1986); see also 
Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Regulation of emerging 
video technologies requires a delicate balancing of competing interests."), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 987 (D.R.I. 
1983) (concluding that cable operators' editorial control over their channels does not cre-
ate immunity from regulation, but, rather, warrants careful scrutiny to ensure that the 
officials are not imposing the regulations because of the speaker's viewpoint), vacated as 
moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). See generally Bollinger, supra note 65, at 36-37 (ad-
vocating the continuation of a partial regulatory system for the media to promote two 
constitutional values at the same time-"access in a highly concentrated press and mini-
mal government intervention"-and thus to achieve a compromise, rather than a victory 
for either side, in the access debate); Ciamporcero, supra note 26, at 392 ("[T]he cable 
operators and the cities are tied closely together by the physical realities of cable televi-
sion. Cooperation seems the best course for both sides."); Meyerson, supra note 46, at 53; 
Recent Developments-Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Municipal Franchis-
ing, 53 TENN. L. REV. 179, 197 (1985). 
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operator's editorial discretion. In contrast, preserving the edito-
rial discretion of cable operators in its purest form-with no re-
strictions-would absolutely prevent public expression and view-
ing through public access channels.128 
A comparison of public access channels with the methods of 
access to other communications media reveals the effectiveness 
of public access channels as a means of furthering the goals of 
the first amendment. For example, no right of access to newspa-
pers exists, although the Berkshire court argued that a person 
may express herself in the print medium by distributing "a writ-
ten message in the form of a leaflet, pamphlet, or other rela-
tively inexpensive form of 'publication.' " 129 This argument, 
however, ignores the importance that a particular form of the 
print medium may have for a speaker and, more importantly, 
the relative ineffectiveness of those alternative forms. A "lonely 
pamphleteer" cannot hope to distribute her speech as effectively 
as a newspaper publisher or cable operator.130 
In broadcasting, the fairness doctrine provides the public with 
access.131 Although both the fairness doctrine and public access 
channels constitute forms of access that aim, at least in part, at 
furthering diversity of expression, public access requirements re-
present a more effective means of accomplishing this goal. 132 
128. The first amendment rights of viewers have often been noted by the courts. See, 
e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."); Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 n.5 (10th Cir. 1981) 
("The First Amendment protects not only the right to disseminate, but also the public's 
interest in the receipt of diversified communications."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 
(1982); Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 981-82, 988. 
129. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 986. 
130. Note, supra note 27, at 204 n.140. 
131. The fairness doctrine "provides that broadcasters have certain obligations to af-
ford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public 
importance." Fairness Doctrine, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1985). The doctrine imposes "two 
affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public importance 
must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints." Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys., 412 U.S. at ·110-11 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 377). Fairness 
doctrine obligations also apply to cable television. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1985). 
132. See Meyerson, supra note 46, at 50-51; Minenberg, supra note 46, at 587-92; 
Comment, Public Access, supra note 31, at 117 (urging consideration of public access 
regulations as "a proper replacement for the fairness doctrine"). See generally Bazelon, 
supra note 110, at 205-06. 
The Berkshire court noted that "(t]he fairness doctrine has come increasingly under 
attack." 571 F. Supp. at 988 n.11. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 
(1984), the Court indicated that it would be forced to reconsider the constitutionality of 
the fairness doctrine if the FCC proved that the net effect of the doctrine is to chill, 
rather than enhance, speech. Id. at 378 n.12; see also American Sec. Council Educ. 
Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (stating that 
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Public access programming may cover the many possible aspects 
of a controversy, while the fairness doctrine may induce portray-
als of "controversial issues of public importance" as issues with 
only two opposing viewpoints.133 Furthermore, public access 
channels allow the public to begin a debate by airing various 
opinions, whereas the fairness doctrine allows public access only 
in response to what has already been said.134 Thus, because of 
the limited access available to both the print and broadcasting 
media, public access to cable television represents an especially 
important means of promoting the goals of the first amendment. 
As the Berkshire court correctly pointed out, "[A] resident ... 
who does not have seven million dollars to develop his own cable 
system is shut out of that medium with no way to express his 
ideas with the widely acknowledged power of the small 
screen. "1311 
Cable operators insist that in place of government regulation, 
such as public access requirements, the free market alone should 
be allowed to regulate cable services. 136 A free market approach 
would avoid harming the first amendment interests of cable op-
erators. In addition, such an approach would prevent the pater-
nalism inherent in the government's determination of what cable 
services the public should receive. 
Cable operators also assert that they would continue to pro-
vide public access channels and that a decision not to do so 
would simply reflect a lack of public interest in access program-
ming.137 Realistically, it seems clear that given a choice between 
he "harbor[ed] grave doubts" about whether the fairness doctrine promotes the goal of 
diversity), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). 
The FCC itself recently concluded that, rather than promoting diversity, the fairness 
doctrine "chills" speech. FCC Report: General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad-
cast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418, 35,423-33 (1985). The FCC stated that it would defer 
action concerning the fairness doctrine pending congressional review of its report. Id. at 
35,453. 
133. Minenberg, supra note 46, at 589 (arguing that the fairness doctrine "reinforces 
the status quo," rather than enhancing diversity in the presentation of news 
programming). 
134. Public access regulations are not contingent upon the acts of the cable operator, 
and thus avoid the fairness doctrine's potential chilling effect on an operator's program-
ming. See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 45, at 212-13; Comment, Public Access, supra note 31, 
at 116-17; see also Minenberg, supra note 46, at 591 (noting that the fairness doctrine is 
limited to political speech). The suggestion that public access channels be monitored by 
local governments for diversity raises the danger of similar "chilling" effects. For an ex-
ample of this suggestion, see Note, supra note 63, at 439 n.105. 
135. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 986. 
136. See Spitzer, supra note 69, at 1391-1402; Comment, supra note 48, at 1411. See 
generally G. SHAPIRO. supra note 47, at 77-135. 
137. See G. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 88; Comment, supra note 48, at 1413 ("If 
access channels are not offered, it will more likely be due to the community's lack of 
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a profitable programming service and public access, cable opera-
tors would not choose to provide public access. 138 This approach, 
however, undervalues the benefits of public access programming. 
Failure to appeal to a mass audience should not be viewed as an 
accurate measure of a public access channel's success. Poor audi-
ence ratings may only be the result of inadequate publicity, 
which can be improved to make a community aware of the avail-
ability of cable access for local citizen use.139 Furthermore, pub-
lic access programming may be very popular within its targeted, 
although limited, audience. Religious or ethnic programming, for 
example, may appeal only to a particular social group, but may 
be widely watched within that group.140 Most importantly, the 
emphasis on popularity ignores the significance of public access 
in promoting the goals of the first amendment.141 
Finally, public access requirements represent a unique form of 
cable regulation that may appropriately be distinguished from 
other cable regulations that infringe upon the editorial discre-
tion of cable operators. For example, in Quincy Cable TV u. 
FCC, 142 the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the FCC's 
must-carry rules, which required cable television operators to 
carry local broadcast signals, because the mandatory signals 
"substantially or completely occupied" the system's channel ca-
pacity and "prevent[ed] cable programmers from reaching their 
intended audience."143 Public access restrictions, in contrast, are 
substantially less intrusive than the Quincy must-carry rules be-
interest in watching these programs than to the cable operators' refusal to offer such 
channels."). 
138. Minenberg, supra note 46, at 591 (Cable operators will "inevitably purchase and 
transmit only profitable programming. Thus, in a cable system without access channels, 
diversity simply means the satisfaction of the preexisting tastes of several segments of 
the audience, rather than those of the audience as a whole.") (footnotes omitted); see 
also Recent Developments, supra note 127, at 194 ("[T]here is evidence to show that 
extensive, direct competition in the industry would reduce the revenue of competing 
firms to the point that no individual firm would have sufficient funds to support the 
widely varied services (many non-revenue-producing, such as public access channels) 
.... "). 
139. See SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 9, at 127-29; J. Ro-
MAN, supra note 20, at 88-89. One commentator lists eight key factors for successful ac-
cess programming: "(l) Clear and concise access definition; (2) Defined operating struc-
ture; (3) Specifically-designated access channels; (4) Appropriate and adequate 
equipment; (5) Appropriate staff; (6) Concise, flexible operating rules and procedure; (7) 
Well designed training program; [and] (8) Adequate operating budget." Buske, supra 
note 10, at 109. 
140. For a discussion of cable's "narrowcasting" capacity, see supra note 107. 
141. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
142. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986). 
143. 768 F.2d at 1453; see also Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1046 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (questioning whether public access channels are in the public interest, and 
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cause public access does not occupy such a large portion of the 
operator's channel capacity.14" More importantly, although ac-
cess regulations intrude upon the editorial discretion of the 
cable operator, they "serve countervailing First Amendment val-
ues by providing a forum for public or governmental authori-
ties."1411 Thus, as the Berkshire court itself concluded, public ac-
cess requirements represent a "sensible accommodation" of the 
public's interest in access to the cable medium and the cable 
operator's editorial freedom. 146 Public access requirements effec-
tively and successfully further the goals of the first amendment, 
while not infringing on the cable operator's discretion as intru-
sively as other cable regulations. Public access . requirements 
thus should be viewed as the most advantageous balance of the 
first amendment interests of the public and cable operators. 
adding that the viewer's interest is even more paramount with cable than with broad-
casting because subscribers pay for service), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
The FCC recently adopted a more narrowly-tailored must-carry program. Amendment 
of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable 
Television Systems, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,606 (1986) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76). The 
first part of this program requires cable systems to offer input selector switches to sub-
scribers. Subscribers can use these switches, with their antennas, to choose between cable 
services and off-the-air signals. Id. at 44,606-07. In addition, this part requires cable op-
erators to conduct a consumer education program concerning "the purpose of, and need 
for, maintaining off-the-air reception capability." Id. at 44,606. In the program's second 
part, the FCC established interim must-carry rules that will expire at the end of five 
years. These rules are "intended to provide an orderly transition to a new environment" 
without must-carry requirements. Id. at 44,606. 
144. The House Report stated that cable operators are not "prevented or chilled in 
any way from presenting their own views and programming on the vast majority of chan-
nels otherwise available to them." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 35, reprinted in 
1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 4672. The degree of intrusion on editorial discre-
tion, of course, will vary according to the channel capacity of the individual cable system, 
and the PEG requirements in the franchise agreement. See Note, supra note 63, at 437 
n.98. In Berkshire Cableuision u. Burke, for example, the state regulations at issue re-
quired cable operators "to set aside no more than seven of their 50 or more channels for 
public access." 571 F. Supp. 976, 988 (D.R.I. 1983), uacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st 
Cir. 1985). Under the Cable Act, the "fallow time" provision may also reduce the initial 
intrusiveness of PEG regulations. The House Report explicitly cited the fallow time pro-
visions in the Cable Act as an example of the statute's accommodation of the cable oper-
ators' interests in editorial discretion. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 7, at 35, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4672. For additional discussion of the fallow 
time provisions in the Cable Act, see supra note 61. 
145. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1452 (dictum). 
146. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 988; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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The absence of a uniform and generally accepted first amend-
ment standard for cable television offers an important opportu-
nity for courts and legislatures to assess the proper policies that 
should guide this medium. These decisionmakers should look for 
guidance to the purposes of the first amendment itself and, ac-
cordingly, should adopt Berkshire's expanded scarcity rationale 
as the appropriate justification for cable regulation. Berkshire's 
rationale serves "to promote the First Amendment by making a 
powerful communications medium available to as many of our 
citizens as is reasonably possible."147 The expanded scarcity ra-
tionale supports regulation to counter the effect of scarcity-the 
removal of an important means of expression from all but a 
small group-and thus furthers the first amendment's goals of 
promoting diversity of expression, self-expression, and the ex-
pression of minority viewpoints. Furthermore, Berkshire's ex-
panded scarcity rationale offers courts and legislatures a theory 
that justifies cable regulation on the basis of the unique charac-
teristics of the cable medium and avoids the illogical distinction 
between broadcast regulation and the nonregulation of newspa-
pers under the current physical form of the scarcity rationale. 
Under the Berkshire rationale, public access requirements re-
present a constitutional and sensible compromise of the conflict-
ing first amendment interests of cable operators and the public. 
By promoting the first amendment interests of the public, while 
not infringing as intrusively upon the editorial discretion of 
cable operators as do other forms of cable regulation, public ac-
cess requirements effectively counter the harmful effects of con-
centration in the cable medium. Finally, although eliminating 
public access requirements would provide stronger protection for 
the editorial discretion of cable operators, this action would ab-
solutely frustrate the goals of the first amendment served by 
public access channels. Only a compromise that respects the in-
terests of both cable operators and the public adequately serves 
the goals of the first amendment. 
-Debora L. Osgood 
147. Id. at 986 (emphasis in original). 
